For Americans, military matters are rarely considered. After all, without a draft, less than one-half of one percent of the nation has any direct involvement with military issues. The Congress is in a similar state largely unaware of military concerns as a Chinese wall has been erected between the military brass and the civilian leadership that makes decisions about its future.
As a consequence, when an American reads about military involvement in governmental matters he shudders, assuming it is a coup or the usurpation of authority. In a May 25, 2014 NY Times article David Kirkpatrick asserts that al Sisi used his military position to manipulate decisions in the Mubarck and Morsi governments. In Egypt, however, military involvement is bred in the bone; it is a staple of state affairs. There is scarcely an Egyptian family that does not have someone serving now or in the past. In fact, as a minister noted during my recent trip to Egypt, “the military is the nation and the nation is the military.”
The kind of circularity is unknown in the West. It was recently reported that a Second Lieutenant, when asked about fighting against terrorism in the Sinai, said that he is prepared to do whatever is necessary to preserve the integrity of Egypt including the sacrifice of his own life. This is not an unusual comment for an Egyptian military officer.
When President Nasser apologized to the Egyptian nation after the humiliating defeat in the ’67 war, the nation rose as one to forgive him and the military.
These points serve as a backdrop for the contention that a democratically elected government was overthrown by military officials. The coming together of 33 million Egyptians (more than a third of the total population) on the streets of every major city on June 30, 2013 was not a “coup” as the Western media portrayed it, but rather a revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood government. Military officials stood with the people on the streets. In fact, General al Sisi, representing the Morsi government, refused to fire on the demonstrators when that order was given. This was not “a we and them” scenario, but rather a union of interests that had only one means of expression, a popular uprising.
That the United States’ government doesn’t fully appreciate this development is, in part, due to the misunderstanding of the military’s civil society role. Military activity is woven into the warp and woof of modern Egyptian history. It is a source of pride, disappointment, and acculturation. It is also the cement that holds together the fragile relationship between the large Muslim majority and the Christian minorities.
When Morsi overplayed his hand by attempting to Islamicize the state, it was the military that balked. In a sense, rarely understood, the Egyptian military was in the revolutionary vanguard. Rather than retarding the democratic process, it was advancing it through support of popular opinion.
In fact, the military is the only segment of the Egyptian population that has sufficient widespread support to maintain stability. As General al Sisi has noted, if the people are dissatisfied with the leadership I offer, the people including the military, will ask me to leave office.
At this point the military is charged with the maintenance of security and keeping a lid on the roughly one million MB (Muslim Brotherhood) members who could engage in civil disturbance. Without security, the Egyptian economy cannot recover. Because of travel advisories in Europe and the United States, tourism is virtually non-existent. On a recent visit, I counted fewer than 20 tourists at the Giza pyramids. Before these political convulsions, there were about 20 million Egyptians working directly or indirectly in this industry. Today the number is in the hundreds.
Hence, the military responsibility is economic and public security. It is the heart that beats for the nation. If the United States is to understand Egypt, it must appreciate the role of the military. The U.S. can also learn a good deal about the Muslim Brotherhood and its links to terrorist organizations as the Egyptian military experience would suggest. Egypt will never forget the many ways the U.S. assisted this nation in its trying moments. Yet it is now asking the U.S. discard its bias about the military and consider the harsh realities of the present. Egypt needs its military and, interestingly, the U.S. needs Egypt as an ally in the on-going struggle against Muslim extremists.
Herbert London is President of the London Center for Policy Research, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of the book The Transformational Decade (University Press of America). You can read all of Herb London’s commentaries atwww.londoncenter.org
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