The war against militant Islamic forces continues apace with modest gains against ISIS and with the emergence of new radical groups after one is defeated. This is a long war we are engaged in, one that can be won only when the root cause is accurately identified. That cause is a doctrine, a doctrine of violence and subordination. It is built into the culture of militates Islam and our unwillingness to recognize it for what it is militants against remedial action.
Fighting a cultural war against an implacable totalitarian ideology is not new. As a nation, we learned how to oppose communism as a powerful but flawed idea. We used publications, front organizations, psy-ops, even dirty tricks as tools of engagement. And despite the lack of leadership from the White House in this cultural struggle at the moment the template for engagement exists.
It is sometimes asserted that there isn’t a strategy for this doctrinal struggle. Yet several of the factors that could yield success are systematically overlooked and bypassed.
First, it is imperative to enlist a cadre of thinkers to publish books and social media tracts that identify in unvarnished form the threat that militant Islam poses to liberties in the West. Freedom of religion, as the West understands it, is threatened by an Islamic belief in submission, death or diminished status. Surely there are books and tracts that already exist which state this matter, but they are not systematically employed as a doctrinal weapon. In order to defeat a foe on the culture front, you can diminish his standing, mock his goals and confuse his acolytes.
Second, there some Muslim organizations that have the courage to oppose militant Islam. These groups should be encouraged, financially rewarded, given a public forum for the expression of an alternative view. When President al Sisi of Egypt gave an address at al Azur condemning the violence within his own religion, the speech received scant attention in the West. In fact, it should have been heralded as the 21st century version of Martin Luther’s 95 Theses. Here was an opportunity to erect formal institutional barriers against militant Islam led by the president of Egypt and the kings of Bahrain and Jordan who supported the Sisi speech.
Third, psy-ops or employing psychological applications against militant Islam is a tactic that could pay off with youthful adherents. At the moment a shahadi is told he will live in Paradise should he kill to advance the will of Allah. But suppose he is told Paradise exists here, in the world, that offers freedom and opportunity and all the pleasures he yearns for. Death should not be a voluntary option, but merely the derision that follows old age. If militant Islam defies rationality, make an irrational plea for life that can be sweet and consistent with Allah’s will.
Fourth, since wars are fought to be won, employ dirty tricks. For example take imam commentary on the nature of dawa – the cultural apparatus of daily Islam – and show that instructions vary, that imams themselves are confused. Use that confusion to suggest there isn’t “one way” to behave as a “good” Muslim. The internet promotes confusion under the best of circumstances. It is time to use it to undermine militant Islamic positions.
In one form or another each of these tactics was used in opposing fascism and communism. There are those in the CIA who were adept at using these methods. Of course, none of this cultural warfare is meaningful without leadership at the top of government. At the least, there should be the realization that this long war needs a cultural strategy as much as victory on the battlefield. These are not mutually contradictory goals. In this war, words may be as effective as bullets.
There are those who sound the voice of futility. However, that is because they assume the project is too large to tackle or too small to gain attention. Edmund Burke did appreciate the character of this doctrinal struggle when he wrote: “No one could make a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do a little.” Actually we once did a lot and should be able to do so again. Even if this strategy fails that is surely better than doing nothing.
Herbert London is President of the London Center for Policy Research, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of the book The Transformational Decade (University Press of America). You can read all of Herb London’s commentaries at www.londoncenter.org
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